Statement By Ms. Arundhati Ghose
Ambassador/Permanent Representative In The Plenary Meeting Of The
Conference On Disarmament, Geneva, August 20, 1996.
Mr. President,
Please accept my congratulations on your assumption of
the Presidency. With your intense experience of the
negotiations on a CTBT in this forum, as Chairman of the
Adhoc Committee on the Nuclear Test Ban and Chairman of
one of the two working groups, there is perhaps no one,
more competent or entitled to preside over this session
of the conference as you are. My delegation would also
like to express its appreciation to the previous
President, Ambassador Urrutia of Peru for the quiet yet
supportive way in which he handled what must have been an
extremely frustrating tenure.
Mr. President, we have just been presented with a Report
of the Adhoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban by its
redoubtable Chairman, Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the
Netherlands. I shall not shower any encomiums on him just
now, as he is still the Chairman and the work of the
Adhoc Committee has still to be completed. I cannot,
however, permit this opportunity to pass without thanking
him for his untiring efforts, supported by his
delegation, in trying to guide the deliberations of the
Adhoc Committee with calmness and determination.
This report, Mr. President which has just been presented
says it all. We were regrettably unable in spite of the
best efforts of all delegations to reach consensus on a
CTBT at this point in time. Several texts were presented
during the negotiations. That there was, albeit
qualified, support for the one proposed by Ambassador
Ramaker on 14th August is clear from the Report. What is
also clear is that may countries, mainly from the G-21
Group of neutral and non-aligned countries had grave
reservations on this text. Indeed, many had wished for
the negotiations to continue so that we could have,
perhaps, been able to reach what we had been mandated to
negotiate, a universal, multilaterally negotiated
consensus text. Unfortunately this was not to be.
Mr. President, for two and half years, we engaged in
intensive negotiations to conclude a Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. Over the years a CTBT had become a symbol of
hope for progress towards nuclear disarmament. India led
the call for a CTBT in 1954 and had co-sponsored many of
the resolutions that helped build the international
momentum behind it. It is a matter of considerable regret
therefore that present efforts, fell far short of what we
had set out to achieve.
In January 1994, we gave ourselves the mandate 'to
negotiate intensively a universal and multilaterally and
effectively verifiable Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, which would contribute effectively to the
prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its
aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and
therefore to the enhancement of international peace and
security.' It reflected the different objectives that
delegations sought to achieve but also the imperative of
a balance. Our approach in the negotiations had been to
try and ensure this balance. Unfortunately the text which
was presented in its latest version by the Chairman on
14th August did not reflect this balance and therefore
did not do justice to the mandate. We believe that the
text, in fact, failed the intent of the mandate. The
urgent challenge before the world community in the
closing years of the century - of capping vertical
proliferation and qualitative upgradation of nuclear
weapons, as well as the advance down the road to
eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth,
which should have been heralded by the CTBT, remain as
much out of reach as ever. Only the ends of horizontal
non-proliferation are reinforced.
As negotiations progressed, we witnessed an evolving text
moving away from the mandate. We have some experience of
this . The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which was
extended indefinitely in 1995, was also a treaty that had
been originally sponsored by India and other countries as
a major disarmament measure, and which, during
negotiations, had been distorted to one which instead
divided the world into nuclear haves and have-nots with
its indefinite extension, nuclear weapons were sought to
be legitimised in the hands of the nuclear weapon states
forever. The arguments put forward by these countries
before the International Court of Justice, immediately
after the NPT extension, reiterated their understanding
that the NPT had legitimised not only indefinite
possession of nuclear weapons by them but also their
right to use them. The world was burdened indefinitely
with a differential notion of sovereignty - one entitled
to nuclear weapons and another not. This cannot be the
basis on which a sane and secure world order can be
erected. The CTBT should have represented a historic
departure for mankind towards a shared goal of a nuclear
weapon free world.
During the negotiations on the CTBT, we tried, through
constructive suggestions, to remove some of these
shortcomings. Our first attempt was to place the CTBT
within the disarmament framework by defining it as the
first step in the process of achieving nuclear
disarmament within a time bound framework. Given that
preambular references to nuclear disarmament in other
treaties have been ignored, we felt that such a reference
would be more meaningful if contained in the operative
part of a Treaty Text. We were not seeking to prescribe a
specific time frame, which we realise requires detailed
consideration. What we were seeking was a commitment
which could have acted as a catalyst for multilateral
negotiations for the elimination of nuclear weapons
within a reasonable span of time. The striving itself
would have rendered the momentum irreversible.
We have always believed that the objective of a CTBT was
to bring about an end to nuclear weapons development. We
are all aware that nuclear explosion technology is only
one of the technologies available to the nuclear weapon
states. Technologies relating to sub-critical testing,
advanced computer simulation using extensive data
relating to previous explosive testing and weapon related
applications of laser ignition will lead to fourth
generation nuclear weapons, even with a ban on explosive
testing. It is a fact that weapons related R&D in
these technologies is being promoted. Our objective
therefore was a truly Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
rather than merely a nuclear test explosion ban treaty.
For many years we had been told that a CTBT was nit
possible because testing was required for safety and
reliability of existing nuclear weapons. We questioned it
then and now we know that we were right. Today,
undergoing explosion technology has the same relevance to
halting development of nuclear weapons by the nuclear
weapon States as banning atmospheric tests did in 1963. A
truly comprehensive treaty should have fossilised the
technology of nuclear weapons.
Despite our efforts, these concerns were not addressed
and nor did India's proposals receive adequate
consideration. The draft text, as we saw it emerging, was
a cause for concern. Inspite of our emphasising these
concerns in the negotiations repeatedly, we found that
these had been ignored in the text presented in May by
the Chairman as "platform for reaching final
agreement". We clearly stated then that we will not
be able to subscribe to that text. In a later version put
forward by the chairman the situation remained unchanged.
As a result we were obliged to reiterate that India could
not subscribe to the Chairman's draft Treaty text.
Mr President, after we made our decisions known, the
Article on Entry into Force was modified in the revised
version of the Chairman's text, apparently at the
insistence of a small number of countries with the clear
aim of imposing obligations on India and placing it in a
position in which it did not wish to be. Such a provision
has no parallel. The procedure adopted despite India's
declares disassociation with the draft text, has been
perceived very negatively in our capital. We should have
hoped that the working of the CD would have been more
transparent. It is unprecedented in multilateral
negotiations and international law that a sovereign
country should be denied it's right of voluntary consent
on adherence to an international treaty. We therefore
expressed our strongest objection to the formulation of
the Article XIV in the Chairman's text. Those that are
insistent on this provision had been well aware of the
clear position of India on the insistence? The CD is a
multilateral negotiating forum of the sovereign states.
Insistence on such provisions which run contrary to
International legal norms and practice will erode the
standing and credibility of the CD, which is the sole
multilateral negotiating body for disarmament.
Mr. President, the perception of the Chairman's text
which I have delineated above is shared across the Indian
political spectrum. The Chairman's text did not serve the
purpose of promoting the realisation of the universal
disarmament goals. Continuing nuclear weapon development
and proliferation in our region which raise national
security concerns for us, were in no way addressed by his
text. Further , the sentiment against the attempted
duress embodied in the Article on Entry into Force is
equally strong. We deeply regret that despite our clear
views and efforts towards an alternate approach, it was
not found possible to take this step. This refusal to
recognise our legitimate left India with no option but to
oppose the adoption of the Chairman's text in the Ad-Hoc
Committee. Our opposition to that text continues . We
would not, therefore, agree to it being forwarded to the
UNGA in any form by this conference. We are aware that GA
resolution 50/65 has expressed the readiness of the GA to
resume its considerations of the item 65 on the CTBT
before the 51st session - with a view to endorsing the
text. Mr. President, the Conference of Disarmament has no
text of a CTBT to recommend to the GA at this time. Our
commitment to nuclear disarmament by continuing to work
towards achieving the objective of a nuclear weapon-free
world , remains undiminished.